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The University visitor is a truly remarkable figure in English law. Des- 
cribed by one writer a\ "redolent of monarchical paternalism in an 
isolated unworldly community of  scholar^"^ this once remote figure has 
become prominent again because of judicial decisions and academic 
writings which have been mostly descriptive rather than critical of his 
allegedly exclusive jurisdiction in University  dispute^.^ Now the visitor is 
about to exercke his jurisdiction in a New Zealand university (apparently 
for the first timef) and a critical examination of the vi\itor's potentially 
far-reaching powers in the local context is clearly needed. For although the 
caselaw on the visitor is mostly both du4ty and clouded one clear point to 
emerge from the case is that the court\ feel jurisdictionally barred from 
reviewing any matter which they consider to be within the purview of the 
visitor. Thus if, as some university official\ believe. . . ."the visitor has 
almost whatever powers he chooses to exerciseM"he courts would indeed 
be emasculated. Fortunately the cases do not go that far. At the same 
time, however, therc has been no marked judicial tendency lo openly con- 
tract the limits of the visitor's traditionally awesome power. For example 
Megarry V-C recently described the visitor as ". . a valuable institution 
for contemporary society, and one which ought to be supported and main- 
tained" (see Patel v Bradford University [ i  9781 WLR 1488, 1500). Sur- 
prisingly such judicial acceptance of the visitor has been accepted with 
cquanimity and cven approbation by most recent  writer^.^ 
Yet unquestioning deferencc to such an archaic institution would seem 
inappropriate in a period of creativity in administrative law and in a time 
when the courts are in the process of unshackling old limitations on their 
A. Samuels "The Student and the Law" (1972) 12 JSPTL 252, 260. 
See especially J. W. Bridge "Keeping Peace in the Universities: The Role of the 
Visitor" (1970) 86 LQR 531; W. M. Ricquier "The University Visitor" (1978) 
4 Dalh LJ C47; T. G. Mathews (1980) 11 University of Queensland L.J. 152; 
P. M. Smith "The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the University Visitor" '(1981) 97 
LQR 160 and R. J. Sadler "The University Visitor: Visitatorial Precedents and 
Procedure in Australia" (1982) 7 University of Tasmania Law Review 2. 
See the correspondence of 28 June 1982 from the Solicitor-General, D. P. Neazor, 
to the Association of University Teachers (AUT) published in (1982) 77 AUTNZ 
Bulletin. In 1974, however, the Governor-General declined to act as Visitor in a 
dispute concerning the History Department at the University of Waikato-this 
information was provided by the Registrar of the University of Waikato in cor- 
respondence of 18 June 1982 to the author. 
' Stated in correspondence of 23 June 1982 from the Registrar of Victoria Univer- 
sity to author. Compare this attitude with attitudes revealed in a survey conducted 
of 300 Registrars in the United Kingdom in which no Registrar suggested that the 
powers of the Visitor were important to a study of contemporary University 
government-discussed in G. C. Moodie and R. Eustace "Power and Authority 
in British Universities" (London, 1974) at pp.40-41. 
V u p r a  fn 1; Bridge at p.544-551; Ricquier at pp.683-684; Sadler a t  pp.30-31. 
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right to review. Modern circumstances require a modern, revitalised 
theory of visitatorial jurisdiction and one which leaves the way open for 
judicial review of University action when appropriate. Redefining the 
visitor's role may involve unrepentantly rejecting anachronistic judgments 
and dicta; but, it is submitted, such an exercise would provide the visitor 
with a role more in keeping witih the spirit, if not the letter, of the old 
caselaw. 
The  tmditional role o f  the Visitor 
Historically the visitor originated in common law as an ecclesiastical 
functionary concerned both to supervise the administration of a church 
or a religious foundation and to prevent and correct offences in those 
foundations. Eventually certain lay charitable corporations known as 
eleemosynary corporations also came into being for the purpose of dis- 
tributing charity. Such corporations (as hospitals, schools, and colleges) 
were established by a private founder and became liable to visitation and 
control either by the founder and his heirs, or by a person designated by 
the founder as Visitor. Tt can be noted though that any civil corporations 
(such as municipal or commercial corporations) which were created for 
purely secular or temporal purposes were not subject to visitation and 
consequently fell under the full jurisdiction of the courts. 
Thus whereas the colleges of the ancient Universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge were eleemosynary corporations of a private nature for the 
promotion of learning and support of people engaged therein, the Universi- 
ties themselves were civil corporations created for the temporal purpose 
of administration and coordination of the colleges' activities. The colleges 
were therefore subject to visitatorial jurisdiction; the Universities were 
subject to the courts. 
The locus classicus of visitatorial jurisdiction in University disputes is 
the judgment of Sir John Holt CJ in Philips v Bury? In that case the 
Chief Justice firstly distinguished the two types of corporations described 
above and then declared: 
". . .the office of Visitor by the common law is to judge according to the statutes 
of the College, to expel and deprive upon just occasions and to hear appeals of 
course. And from him and him only the party grieved ought to have redress; in 
him the founder have reposed so entire confidence that he will administer justice 
impartially that his determinations are final and examinable in no other court 
whosoever".7 
Numerous subsequent cases concerning disputes within the Oxbridge 
Colleges made essentially the same points? The Founder of a College had 
the right to do with his property and goods as he wished. If he vested 
charity in persons who were to receive the benefit he then had the right 
" 1 Ld Raym 5; Lord Holt CJ was in fact dissenting from the majority in the Court 
of King's Bench but his judgment was later upheld by the House of Lords in 
Show 35. 
' Ibid., a t  8. 
The old cases are canvassed in detail by the writers ennumerated supra fn 1. See 
especially Bridge and Smith. See also R. Pound "Visitatorial Jurisdiction" (1936) 
49 Haw. L. Rev. 369. 
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to make them subject to private laws of which a designated visitor should 
be the judge. Moreover the visitor had the responsibility for the internal 
management of such a private institution and the visitor's powers ranged 
from hearing appeals against expulsion to exercising the power of expulsion 
itself. In such matters the visitor's jurisdiction was final and exclusive and 
no action with respect to such matters could lie in the courts. 
In the C19th Sir Richard Kindersley V-C delivered an importact and 
oft-cited judgment of which the tenor was a strong reaffirmation of the 
orthodox view of visitatorial jurisdiction. However in one crucial sentence, 
not yet fully explored by the courts, the learned judge offered a means of 
escape from the visitor's grip. The case of Thomson v University o f  
London concerned the disputed award of a Gold Medal in Law (which 
was clearly an internal matter) and Sir Richard Kindersley V-C in the 
course of his judgment d e ~ l a r e d : ~  
". . .Whatever relates to the internal arrangements and dealings with regard to 
the government and management of the house, of the domus of the institution is 
properly within the jurisdiction of the Visitor and only under the jurisdiction of 
the Visitor, and this Court will not interfere in those matters: but when it comes 
to a question of right of property, or rights as between the University and a third 
person delzors the University or, with regard, it may be, to any breach of trust 
committed by the corporation, that is the University, and so on, or any con- 
tracts by the corporation, not being matters stated to the mere management and 
arrangement and details of their domus then indeed this Court will interfere." 
Thus any questions of property, or of trusts, or of rights of persons outside 
the University or most significantly, of contracts not involving the manage- 
ment or detail of the domus would be questions within the province of 
the courts.1° The opportunity was now open for Courts to assert control 
by, for example, categorising an appropriate University dispute as con- 
tractual and thereby claiming jurisdiction. Such categorisation would not 
be too difficult. For instance it is clearly possible for the courts to find a 
contractual relationship between a student and his University--assuming 
the student has paid his fees and signed his matriculation declaration.ll 
" (1864) 33 LJCh 625 at 634. 
"For illustrative cases on questions of trusts see Greeiz v Rutherford (1750) 1 Ves 
Sen 462; on questions involving persons outside of the University see Ex p Davisort 
(1772) 1 Cowp 319 as set out in R v Grundort (1735) 1 Cowp 315, 319; on 
contract see R v Dr Windham 1 Cowp 377. The list of exclusionary questions would 
not be exhaustive-e.g. quaere any questions of breach of natural justice discussed 
in text. (But see Herring v Templeman [I9731 2 All ER 581 (affd on different 
reasoning [I9731 3 All ER 569)). 
"See two English cases reported, regrettably, only in the London Times: Sammy v 
Birbeck College The Times 3.11.64 (also (1964) 108 Sol Jo 897) and D'Meflo 
The Times 17.6.70 (a fuller judgment is reported in the NCCL's Report on 
"Academic Freedom and the Law" (London, 1970 at pp.64-65)). In Canada the 
question of any contractual relationship between student and University was left 
open by Spence J in the Canadian Supreme Court in King v University o f  Saskat- 
chewan (1969) 6 DLR 120, 128 but such a relationship has been accepted in both 
Langlois v Rector and Members of Lava1 University (1974) 47 DLR 674 and 
Goverrzors of Acadia University v Sutcliffe (1978) 85 DLR 115. In the USA it has 
been accepted in such cases as Anthony v Syracuse University (1928) 231 N Y  Supp 
435 and discussed in "Academic Freedom" 81 Harv L. Rev 1045, 1145-1197 
(author unknown). The contractual analysis of University disputes has however 
been criticised on policy grounds by Bridge supra fn 1 at 548-549. 
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This could mean that University authorities are contractually bound by 
implication to provide proper tuition and to employ professional skill 
and competence in the assessing of examinations (see Samtny v Birbeck 
Co1legel2) But the courts have been somewhat unimaginative and have 
neglected to seize the opportunity. T'hus in Thorne v University o f  Lon- 
don [ I  9661 2 QB 237 a claim in negligence for misjudging a student's 
papers was smartly dismissed on the sole ground that these matters fell 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the visitor and outside the jurisdiction 
of the court. Perhaps judicial reticence to review such matters is appropri- 
ale; but unquestioned submissiveness to an allegedly exclusive visitatorial 
jurisdiction surely is not. 
Yet if anything the more modern English authorities have expanded 
rather than restricted the ambit of the visitor's jurisdiction. In R v Dun- 
sheath ex p Meredith [I 9511 1 KB 127, 132 Lord Goddard CJ suggested, 
obiter, that not only did the visitor have jurisdiction over the traditionally 
defined area of an election to a fellowship but also over the previously 
undecided area of ". . .whether a particular person is a fit and proper 
person to be appointed and retained as a teacher at a University". Similarly 
in Putel v Brudford University (supra) Megarry V-C asserted that the 
visitor's exclusive jurisdiction was not confined, as previously thought, 
ratione personae to persons who are members of the University but rather 
was founded ratione materiae to all questions of "disputed membership". 
Thus he concluded ". . .it is much a function of a visitor to determine what 
persons lawfully have or ought to have become members of the corporation 
as it is to determine whether a member has or has not lawfully been 
amoved".13 And so the implication from that learned judge's reasoning 
was that not only could a person in the applicant's position seek visitatorial 
adjudication (as a student seeking readmission) but that an applicant 
rejected for admission could apparently also apply. The old authorities 
had not even obliquely hinted at that. 
The Need for a New Reality 
The modern New Zealand University is eleemosynary in the sense that 
it is established for the promotion of learning,14 but nevertheless it is 
radically different from the Oxbridge Colleges in whioh visitatorial juris- 
diction took root. Entirely new reasons would therefore be needed to 
justify the retention of ancient visitatorial powers. As Powell J recognised 
in the U.S. Supreme Court in Nutionul Lcrbuur Relutions Board v Yeshiva 
University 63 L.Fd 115, 138 "[tlhe university of today bears little resem- 
blance to 'the community of scholars' of yesteryear. Education has become 
big business. . .". 
Ibid. Compare though Thornson v University of London supra, fn 9. 
l' [I9781 1 WLR 1488 at 1497 (Affd 1979 1 WLR 1066). 
"See, for example, s.3(1) University of Canterbury Act 1961. The empowering 
Acts which established the four universities of Auckland, Victoria, Canterbury and 
Otago in 1961 and Massey and Waikato in 1964 gave them essentially the same 
constitution. For the sake of simplicity illustrative examples will generally be taken 
from the University of Canterbury Act 1961. 
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In the times of Philips v Bury (supra) the Oxbridge College was a 
small closed community of learned men, which had been established by a 
benevolent founder for the purpose of promoting learning. Enjoying a 
stipend from the Founder's bounty they agreed as members of the College 
to be bound by the Founder's private laws. 
The present New Zealand University however has a vastly expanded 
membership which includes undergraduates15 and the university is a public 
institution "founded" or established by statute for the public purpose of 
higher education. The university is founded to large extent by the govern- 
ment through recurring quinquennial grants (distributed by the University 
Grants Committee) and it unquestionably is public rather than private in 
its nature. Prima facie it should therefore be subject to public scrutiny in 
the courts. 
This conclusion is reinforced when other changes in the university are 
considered. The Oxbridge Colleges had an essentially religious base with 
common ideals and values. This is in marked contrast to the modern New 
Zealand university which by its first empowering statute was prohibited 
from administering any religious test16 and which in the present day has 
quiet incoherent and disparate goals and values. Similarly tlhe Oxbridge 
College was authoritarian in both structure and spirit whereas the modern 
university is essentially democratic with both staff and occasionally students 
participating in decisionmaking.'' 
Frequently the old cases explained that the Visitor was the person best 
equipped to interpret the statutes and regulations of the eleemosynary 
corporation as he had a familiarity with them not enjoyed by the courts.ls 
This argument had some validity when the visitor was a bishop administer- 
ing provisions of an essentially charitable foundation and it had some 
validity even in later years when the common visitor was the Lord Chan- 
cellor as representative of the Crown. However in New Zealand it could 
not seriously be contended that the Governor-General as Visitor of the 
universities has more expertise in interpreting Acts of Parliament than does 
the High Court.lg 
For all these reasons it is not surprising there are numerous dicta in 
lB Ibid. s.3(2). In former times only the scholars amongst the undergraduates were 
members (see Pate1 v Bradford University supra at 1500); and as recently as 1969 
Harman J described undergraduate membership of a University as "unusual" (in 
University of Essex v Ratclifle "The Times" 27.11.69). The expansion in member- 
ship means the Visitor's potential jurisdiction has become much more formidable. 
lo See s.14 New Zealand University Act 1879. Also s.12 University of Otago ordinance 
1869 (now a schedule to the University of Otago Amendment Act 1961). 
" See AUT report "University Government and Organisation" (1965) and Report 
of Committee on University Government (1972). See also, for example s.6(2) 
(h) - (j)  University of Canterbury Act 1961. 
l 8  See for example Att-Gen v Taibot 3 Atk 663, 675 R v Bishop o f  Ely 5 T.R. 475, 
477. (More recently see R v Dunsheath Ex p Meredith [I9511 1 KB 127, 134.) 
''See, for example, Graeme-Evans v University of Adelaide (1974) 6 SASR 302 
in which Wells J construed s.12 University of Adelaide Act 1972 in order to 
determine the eligibility of a graduate as an undergraduate representative of the 
Council. No reference was made to s.20 of the same Act appointing the Governor 
as Visitor and the procedure of originating summons was described as "entirely 
appropriate" (at 303). 
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Commonwealth decisions expressing doubts whether the Visitor's powers 
remain unabated.20 
As Dickson J said in his dissenting judgement in the Supreme Court of 
Canada Re Harelkin and University of Regina (1979) 96 DLR (3d) 14 
at 33, ". . .one might well question the practical relevance of this English 
institution to a modern Canadian University"; and it is perhaps significant 
that despite the statutory provisions for a Visitor the respondent University 
in that case did not even attempt to argue that exclusive jurisdiction lay 
with him. 
The New ZeuIund Position 
The key but somewhat obscure provision in all empowering statutes of 
the six New Zealand universities is to the effect that: 
"the Governor-General shall be the Visitor of the University and shall have all 
the powers and functions usually possessed by  visitor^".^' 
The history of this statutory provision is interesting. Prior to the estab- 
lishment of autonomous universities in 1961 the powers of the Governor- 
General as Visitor of the University of New Zealand were different from 
the powers of the Minister of Education as Visitor of the four constitutent 
universities within the federated system. 
The Visitor to the governing university of New Zealand was clearly in a 
subordinate position to the Council. It  was stated in s.17 of the New 
Zealand University Act 1870 (and in subsequent enactments for the 
University until 1961) that the Visitor: ". . .should have authority to do 
all things which appertain to Visitors in such manner as shall from time 
to time be directed by the Governor with the approval of the Council of 
the said University". Within the constituent Universities the Minister of 
Education was given powers equivalent to those now granted to the 
Governor-General as Visitor in the 1961  act^.^" 
Although in the light of the 1961 enactments it is impossible to argue 
that the Governor-General is still a mere agent of the University Councils 
this previous express limitation on his powers is of some interest when 
considering what the visitor's "usual" powers were then assumed to be. 
However in the only judicial consideration in New Zealand of visitatorial 
jurisdiction Turner J held in Bell v University of Auckland [I9691 NZLR 
1029 that his area of jurisdiction was that prescribed by Sir Richard 
Kindersley V-C in Thomson v University of London (supra). 
In Bell's case a lecturer brought an action against the respondent Uni- 
versity alleging breach of contract of employment. He argued that by 
20 See, for example, dicta of Halse Rogers J in Ex p King; Re University o f  Sydney 
(1944) 44 S.R. (NSW) 19 at 43 and in Ex p McFayden (1945) 45 S.R. (NSW) 
200 at 205; also dicta of Brossard J in R v Royal Institution for the Advancement 
of Learning ex p Fekete (1969) 2 DLR (3d) 129 at  138. cf the views of Lord 
Goddard in R v Dunsheath ex p Meredith [I9511 1 KB 127, 133 to the effect that 
statutory incorporation of a visitor does not affect visitatorial jurisdiction. 
" See, for example, s.5 University of Canterbury Act 1961 (Note s.5 Lincoln College 
Act provides that the Minister of Education shall be the Visitor of the College). 
See, for example, s.4 Canterbury University College Act 1933. 
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virtue of certain notices and letters it was an express contractual term 
that his application for promotion would be determined by the Promotions 
Advisory Committee of the University Council but that in fact it was 
determined by the Education Committee. The University moved to strike 
out the statement of claim on the basis that the jurisdiction of the Court 
had been taken away by statutory provision for a Visitor. 
The applicant submitted in response that the office of Visitor was a 
purely ceremonial position but this argument was firmly rejected by Turner 
J.  His Honour held that if the issue in dispute had been one which "tradi- 
tionally" lay within the exclusive province of the Visitor he would have 
declined jurisdiction and he accepted as authoritative cases such as 
Thomson v University of London (supra) and R v Dunsheath ex p 
Meredith (supra). Nevertheless Turner J seized on the tantalizing dicta 
of Sir Richard Kindersley V-C in the former case and held that questions 
of contract of employment could conceivably remain in the domain of the 
courts notwithstanding the appointment of a Visitor. On this basis his 
Honour refused to strike out the statement of claim although he did 
acknowledge that at a later stage of the trial no course of action might be 
disclosed.23 
The judgment is of some significance. As suggested before, the exception 
of contractual questions, if developed, could drastically whittle away the 
Visitor's traditional powers, which Turner J did in fact suggest were extant. 
The contractual exception had certainly been recognised in the old caselaw 
but only in the limited context of a contractual dispute between the Uni- 
versity and some person outside the University. Here Turner J was lhinting 
that the arguably internal question of a promotions dispute between the 
university and one of its members could also be classified as contractual 
with the consequence that the Visitor's exclusive jurisdiction was thereby 
ousted. 
This decision which has already been followed by several Canadian 
courtsz4 may point the way to New Zealand courts breaking the strangle- 
hold of the old caselaw. Certainly in the early case of Tubbs v Auckland 
University Council (1908) 27 NZLR 149 which concerned the summary 
dismissal of a Professor-an issue which under many authorities should 
have fallen under the purview of the Visitor-Denniston J also determined 
the dispute on a contractual basis without averting to the existence or juris- 
diction of the Visitor. 
Confirmation that the Visitor in New Zealand enjoys a rather more 
confined role is provided by two other decisions on the interpretation of 
university legislation. Under traditional caselaw one of the Visitor's primary 
functions was the interpretation of the University's empowering legislation 
and internal statutes (see, for example, Attorney-General v Stephens 
(1737) 1 Atk 358). Yet in Cliflord v University of New Zealand [I9451 
"In fact the plaintiff's action was subsequently unsuccessful. Information to this 
effect was kindly provided by the Registrar of the University of Auckland. 
*'Re Webb and Simon Fraser University (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 244, 246-247; Riddle 
v University of Victoria (1978) 84 DLR (3d) 164, 165 (affd [I9791 3 WWR 289), 
and see also McWhirter v University of Alberta (1976) 63 DLR (3d) 684, 716. 
Note that Bridge op. cit. suggested Turner J's approach was inconsistent with the 
category of cases represented by R v Dunsheath ex p Meredith. 
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GLR 396 the issue concerned the correct interpretation of two clauses in 
an internal statute of the respondent university relating to the Bachelor 
of Laws degree; the court however proceeded to analyse closely the 
provisions of the statute without mentioning the Visitors existence. 
(Indeed the result of the case was that the Court awarded mandamus 
compelling the respondent to admit the enrollment of the applicant stu- 
dent). Similarly in University of New Zealand v Solicitor-Gene& [I9171 
NZLR 353 the Full Court of the Supreme Court considered the interpreta- 
tion of a provision in the empowering New Zealand Universities Act 1908 
concerning the respective powers of the Senate and Board to make statutes 
and regulations. Again, no reference was made to the Visitor's jurisdiction 
and the court noting that by Act of Parliament the Senate was "the sole 
judge" of an emergency (which thereby increased the Senate's powers) 
announced at 360: 
"[tlhe Governor in Council is not a Court of Appeal to determine whether such 
emergency has arisen, although he is the authority to consider whether the par- 
ticular statute or regulation is one to which he should give his approval or 
sanction". 
This comment, although not directly relevant to the question of visitatorial 
jurisdiction, does lend some weight to the view that the Governor-General 
is not necessarily the proper body to determine all University questions. 
Further questions arise as to the role of the Visitor in New Zealand when 
consideration is given to internal University legislation. It must be remem- 
bered that the Visitor's powers are limited by Act of Parliament to those 
"usually" possessed and that the powers of the Visitor in New Zealand 
are therefore subject to University conventions and perceptions. Thus any 
indication, in either the empowering or the internal legislation which sug- 
gest that the University is subject to judicial review rather than visitatorial 
review are of some relevance because one of the former arguments in 
favour of visitatorial jurisdiction was the view that the Founder of the 
University College intended his creation "to be free of all foreign suits" 
(Dr  Patrick's case 1 Lev 65, 66). 
However s.1 of the University of Otago Ordinance 1869 (which was the 
original empowering legislation for the University of Otago and is now a 
schedule to the empowering 1961 Act) provides that the University shall: 
". . .answer and be answered unto in all Courts of New Zealand". 
Otago's Disciplinary Regulations also provide Part VIII, reg.7 that: 
"[n]othing in these regulations is intended to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts 
to review any decision of any disciplinary body established by the Students 
Association, of the Provost, of the University Discipline Board or of the Uni- 
versity Council". 
Similarly regu!ations at Canterbury University make provision for a 
high University official to perform a function which in olden times clearly 
belonged to the Visitor. These regulations provide that: 
"[wlhere in any case it is shown to the satisfaction of the Vice-Chancellor that 
hardship has been or will be caused to any student by: . . . ((ii) a misinterpreta- 
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tion of these or any other regulations by an autborised member of the University 
staff; . . .the Vice-Chancellor may make such provision as he thinks fit for the 
relief of such hardship". 
This function of interpretation of internal legislation in the event of dispute 
traditionally belonged to the V i s i t ~ r . ~ ~  
Obviously not too muclh weight can be attached to such slight provisions 
(which could in any event be attacked on the grounds of vires) but the 
provisions do show that the Visitor is not perceived to enjoy the full 
panoply of his traditional powers. His "usual" powers may not be that 
extensive. 
The University as u Stututory Body 
As previously discussed the statutory basis of University action clearly 
distinguishes modern Universities from those of former times. This must 
affect the question of visitatorial jurisdiction. If an Act of Parliament is 
regarded as "the law of the land" then dicta can be cited from cases such 
as R v St. Johns College to the effect that: 
"[rlhe Visitor is made by the founder and is the proper judge of the private laws 
of the Colleges, he is to determine offences against those laws. But where the 
law of the land is disobeyed the court will take notice notwithstanding the 
Visitor. . ."26 
Occasionally it is said that statutory incorporation makes no difference 
to the question of visitatorial jurisdiction but Commonwealth cases, par- 
ticularly from Canada, belie the truth of that. For if the University dispute 
derives from the exercise of a statutory power, it must the11 enter the public 
law arena. Thus in King v Universtiy of Saskatchewan the Supreme Court 
of Canada considered a request for mandamus from a student who alleged 
a breach of natural justice in the conduct of University bodies which had 
determined his appeal from a Departmental refusal to award him a law 
degree. The judge at first instance had accepted the University's submission 
that the granting of degrees was essentially a domestic matter within the 
Visitor's jurisdiction; however the Supreme Court adopted the view of the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that the applicant's immediate aim was the 
enforcement of statutory public duties and that such duties were quite 
capable of being enforced by mandamu~.'~ In a similar vein Weatherston 
"It was also of interest that at the University of Canterbury a Mediator has been 
appointed to resolve, inter alia, disputes "between a member of the academic staff 
and the administration." That is also a matter which would fall within the Visitor's 
traditional jurisdiction. 
'V Mod 233 at 241. See also R v Blaizd 7 Mod 355 at 356. 
27 R v Dunsheath ex p Meredith (supra). See also Sir Henry Winneke's decision as 
Visitor in R v Uiziversity of Melbourne ex  p Sirnone [I9811 V.R. 378. 
" (1969) 6 DLR 120, 124-125 [Further Canadian cases indicating that the preroga- 
tive writs are potentially available to students against the University are Re Polten 
and Governing Body o f  University of Toronto (1976) 59 DLR (3d) 197 and Re 
Schabas and Caput of University o f  Toronto (1975) 52 DLR (3d) 4951. In Aus- 
tralia see similar dicta in Ex p King Re University o f  Sydney (supra) 19 at 31 and 
43 as discussed by the High Court of Australia in R v Ulziversity of Sydney ex  p 
Drurnmond (1943) 67 CLR 95. 
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JA of the Ontario Court of Appeal recently asserted in Re Paine and the 
University of Toronto (1982) 131 DLR (3d) 325, 329 that "[tlhere can be 
no doubt that the University of Toronto is a statutory body amenable to 
certiorari". 
Canadian courts have however encountered difficulties in determining 
whether action taken by a University body which is not specifically estab- 
lished by the empowering Act of Parliament but rather by University 
discretion or regulation can be regarded as subject to judicial rather than 
vistatorial review.2g In New Zealand however the provisions of the Judica- 
ture Amendment Act 1972 (as amended in 1977) extend over a fairly wide 
area of public activity. For example, s.3 (as amended) defines a "statutory 
power" to include a power or right conferred under "the rules or bylaws 
of any body corporate". The ready accessibility of remedies under this 
Act should encourage judicial review. 
Nevertheless some University activity may still fall outside the purview 
of the Act. For instance one must speculate whether an application for 
review would be the appropriate method of review for a Departmeiltal 
decision given that Departments are not expressly created either by Act of 
Parliament or by internal University legislation. In such circumstances, 
however, an applicant could still seek either an ordinary injunction or 
some declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908. It 
might still however be necessary to establish a "public" non-domestic 
aspect to the dispute so as to avoid the argument it belonged to the private 
domestic jurisdiction of the Visitor. However any significant action 
affecting students or staff could be seen as aspects of the University's public 
duty to provide instruction (Riddle v University) of Victoria [I9791 3 
WWR 289, 331). The Visitor's role could thus be viewed as a residual 
one in the manner described later in this article. 
Judicial Review of the Visitor 
There are an abundance of dicta stating that any decision of the Visitor 
is final and subject to no appeal (see for example, Philips v Bury, supra); 
but such dicta do not concern the power of the courts to review on any of 
the traditional public law grounds. The Visitor is a statutory official with 
limited jurisdiction and is therefore as subject to judicial review as any 
other statutory ofticial. This was noted by Megarry V-C in Patel v Bradford 
University 119781 1 WLR 1488 at 1499, when he held that the Visitor can 
". . .give a decision which apart from any impropriety or excess of juris- 
diction is final and will not be disturbed by the courts". The old authorities 
also recognised that the Visitor had both defined boundaries of jurisdiction 
and compellable duties and there are numerous instances where prohibition 
and mandamus have been granted against him.30 Anomalously it seems 
certorari does not lie against the Visitor31 and in New Zealand particular 
problems must arise with any prorogative remedy lieing against the 
Compare Vanek v Governors of  University of Alberta (1976) 57 DLR (3d) 595, 
with Re Elliott and Governors of University of Alberta (1973) 37 DLR (3d) 197. 
"See Bridge op. cit. pp.544-545 and Smith op. cit. at pp.650-651. 
" See S. A. de Smith "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" (4th ed) p.386 
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Governor-General. However, a declaration does lie against the Governor- 
General and in practice such a remedy would be as useful as a coercive 
one. Moreover s.4(2) Judicature Amendment Act 1972 provides that if 
on an application for review the applicant is entitled to a declaration that 
a decision is invalid then the court may instead of making such a declar- 
ation set the decision aside. Conceivably this power could be available 
against the University Visitor. 
The old authorities also established that a Visitor's jurisdiction is 
reviewable on the grounds of breach of natural justice.32 As a breach of 
natural justice is now generally regarded as a jurisdictional err0l.3~ this 
provides the justification, if any were needed, for arguing that the Visitor's 
decisions rnay be reviewed for jurisdictional error in the broad sense. The 
possibility of such wide-ranging review is in itself an indication that the 
Visitor can no longer be adequately viewed as the exclusive adjudicator 
of university disputes. 
Judicial Attitudes in Reviewing University Action 
Being a statutory body the university should, in principle, be open to 
attack on any of the administrative law grounds--e.g. ultra vires, juris- 
dictional error, breach of natural justice, fraud, or the as yet undefined 
ground of mistake of fact. It is submitted that the existence of the Visitor 
should no longer be regarded as a jurisdictional restriction on the court's 
power to award relief, but should at most be a factor to be weighed by 
the court in exercising its discretion to grant or withhold relief. Neverthe- 
less the courts would still be expected to evince considerable reluctance in 
interposing in university disputes. In former times the reasons advanced 
for such unwillingness ranged from the floodgates argument to the undesir- 
ability of distracting "learned men from their studies" and of wasting their 
time (see A ttorney-General v Talbot") . 
The reason given today however for judicial restraint is essentially one 
of respect for university autonomy. Thus the Supreme Court of Canada 
has propounded the view that because the Legislature has accorded a large 
measure of autonomy to the universities it is the duty of the courts to 
similarly attribute it by restraint in the issue of prerogative writs (see 
K m e  v Board of Governors o f  the University of British Columbia (1980) 
110 DLR (3d) 31 1, 321 and Re Harelkin and University of Regina (1979) 
96 DLR (3d) 14, 57). Thus in the latter case it was said that the scheme of 
university legislation presupposed the solution of domestic disputes within 
the university. However a judicial warning has also been given that it does 
not follow from the fact of university autonomy that the university is 
immune to applications of ultra vires; the University must still operate 
"See Sadler op. cit at pp.23-28. 
" See generally Anisminic v Foreign. Compensation Commission 119691 2 All ER 208, 
213; compare though South East Asia Fire Bricks v Non Metallic Mineral Products 
Manufacturing Employees Union [I9801 2 All ER 689, 692. 
" 3  Atk 663 672 and 676. See also reasons of expedience given in St. Johns College 
v Toddington 1 Keny 440, 460 and Exp Wrangham 2 Ves June 607, 619. (If how- 
ever, it is thought the Visitor provides a speedy means of redress the experience 
of the University of Waikato should be considered-see (1982) 77 AUT NZ 
Bulletin). 
318 Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 1, 19821 
within the limits (albeit broad) of the empowering Act (Clark v University 
o f  Melbourne [I9781 VR 457, 463).35 
Another reason why the courts may be hesitant to review is because 
of the courts awareness of the special needs and nature of university 
activity. Thus special tolerance has been accorded to Universities in the 
matters of delegation of judicial discretion (Ex p Forster the University 
o f  Sydney [I9641 NSWR 1000, 1009) and of bias (King v University of 
Saskatchewan (1969) 6 DLR (3d) 120, 131 and R e  Puine (1982) 131 
DLR (3d) 325, 331 ). 
Indeed lack of intimate knowledge of university functioning may result 
in unrealistic judicial decisions. For example, in Herring v Templeman 
[I9731 3 All ER 569 Russell LJ considered that a hearing was not needed 
at the level of the academic board in a case concerning exclusion for 
unsatisfactory academic performance. He reached this conclusion on the 
ground that the board could only make recommendations to the Govern- 
ing Body. Yet in reality the effective decision maker would almost certainly 
be the academic board because of the fact that in universities there is a 
de facto system of internal hierachical control. Ideas flow upwards and 
are by convention rarely disturbed by the highest governing body.36 
Sometimes the subject matter of the dispute is regarded as inappropriate 
for judicial review. There is always judicial reluctance to review private 
disciplinary proceedings and this is equally true of university disciplinary 
 proceeding^.^^ For obvious reasons there is also considerable reluctance to 
interfere in matters of academic judgment and evaluation (see U.S. 
Supreme Court decision of Board of Curators of University, o f  Missouri v 
Horowitz 435 US 78, 55L Ed 3d 124). It has been said that "[tlhe context 
of educational societies involves a special factor which is not present in 
other contexts-namely the relation of tutor and pupil"; (Glynne v Keele 
University [I9711 2 All ER 89, 95 per Pennycuick V-C). Thus the edu- 
cational process i5 not seen as suited to adversary proceedings given that a 
university teacher is meant to occupy "roles of educator, adviser, and 
friend" (Board of Curators o f  University of Missouri v Horowitz, supra 
at 90). For this reason it is occasionally stated to be "wholly undesirable" 
that an educational society should be fettered by natural justice" (see 
Ward v Bradford Corporation 1972 LGR 27, 37 per Phillimore LJ).  
And it is therefore sometimes said that University bodies must be masters 
of their own procedure (see University of Ceylon v Fernondo [I9601 All 
E R  631, 638 and Herring v Templeman (supra at 587). Considerable trust 
is also placed in the "good sense and wisdom" of University decision- 
makers (see Ex p Forster R e  University of Sydney (supra a t  1008) and 
Re Schabas et a1 and Caput of University of Toronto (1975) 52 DLR 
(3d) 495, 526). 
Reversed on other grounds [I9791 VR 66. 
"For discussion of this penomenon see Lord Ashby's Joan Woodward Memorial 
lecture "University Hierarchies" (Imperial College, 1976) and see D. Christie "A 
Problem of Jurisdiction and Natural Justice" (1974) 37 MLR 324. 
"Discipline was once described by Lord Keynon CJ as "the soul" of the Univer- 
sity in R v Chancellor of the University of Cambridge 6 TR 89, 106. See also Lord 
Campbell CJ in Exp Death (1852) 18 QBD 647, 658. In a non-University context 
see a recent example of this judicial reluctance in R v BBC exp Lavelle "The 
Times" 8.7.82. 
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Even so it is salutary to remember that in administrative law there is no 
such thing as an unfettered statutory discretion. Thus any statutory dis- 
cretion whether it be admitting a matriculated student to a particular course 
of study ( E x  p Foster supra at 1006) or assessing professional competence 
(R v Askew 4 Burr 2185, 2188) or dismissing a Professor ( R e  the Univer- 
sity of Saskatchewan and MacLaurin [I9201 2 WWR 823 at 827) must 
necessarily be exercised bonafide for proper purposes and not in an 
"arbitrary, capricious or biassed way". 
Students and Natural Justice 
Even when the obstacle of visitatorial jurisdiction has not been raised, 
student applicants have been notably unsuccessful in any allegations of 
breach of natural justice. Often their failure is attributable to the judicial 
attitudes noted above. Yet with student applicants there is sometimes an 
additional unvoiced reason for declining a remedy which is not present 
with applications for review by academic staff-this is the feeling that 
universities still act in loco parentis and therefore have authority to deal 
with students as they think fit unfettered by procedural requirements?$ 
This feeling can manifest itself in several ways. For instance the require- 
ments of natural justice can be minimised to the point of extinction if the 
court happens to believe that an applicant trainee teacher "would never 
make a teacher" (Ward v Bradford Corporation supra per Lord Denning 
at 35); similarly the requirements can in effect be nullified altogether if 
the court in its discretion denies a remedy to the student because it feels 
the penalty is "intrinsically a perfectly proper one" (Glytzne v Keele Uni- 
versify, supra at 97)?9 The assumption occasionally seems to be that 
students lose certain rights on entering the University gates. 
However, even Glynne's case is authority for the proposition that the 
rules of natural justice do apply when a fundamental power such as sus- 
pension is being exercised. Other cases, however, also illustrate that the 
requirements may be minimal. Thus it was held by the Privy Council that 
even where credibility of witnesses was essentially the issue in disciplin- 
ary proceedings prior to suspension, a fair hearing could be given without 
crossexamination (see University of Ceylon v Fernando, supra).40 It has 
also been held that an academic board's decision to exclude a student from 
"See D. C. Holland "The Student and the Law" (1969) Current Legal Problems 
61, at pp.66-69. 
JsThis is a significantly different test from the still controversial view that a discre- 
tionary remedy may be refused if the same result would have been reached after 
a full hearing (see R v Senate of the University of Aston ex p Rofley [I9691 2 
All ER 964, 975). A paternalistic view towards students is evidenced in other cases 
e.g. Brighton Corporation v Parry [I9721 L.G.R. 576, 588. In the USA the New 
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, has upheld the University's dismissal of 
a student on the ground "she was not a typical Syracuse girl" in Anthony v 
Syracuse University (1928) 231 NY Supp 435. 
'O (19601 All ER 631. Their Lordships did however hold at 641 that the objection 
would have been "more formidable" if the student had requested crossexamination 
and been denied it. (Such a procedural burden may seem unfair but has been 
suggested in other cases e.g. Glynne v Keele University [I9711 2 All ER 89, 96). 
On the denial of crossexamination in other jurisdictions see Re Schabas et a1 and 
Caput of University of Toronto l(1975) 52 DLR (3d) 495, 508 and Bluett v Board 
of Trustees of University of Illinois 134 NE 2d 635, 637. 
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a Teachers College need not be preceded by an oral hearing if there have 
been written submissions (see Brighton Corporation v Parry 1972, LGR 
576, 586).41 It has similarly been held that legal representation is not 
necessarily a prerequisite in disciplinary proceedings leading to expulsion 
(see Ex p Bolchover "The Times" 6.10.70). 
Generally one would expect the requirements of natural justice to be 
more rigorous when the University deals with disciplinary rather than 
academic matters. Spence J said in King v University of Saskatchewan 
supra at 129, "[ilt is difficult to conceive of a situation which would have 
the representatives of a law school faculty confronting the representatives 
of a student in a trial of an issue as to whether a degree should be granted". 
Yet as Megarry V-C has correctly pointed out the judgments in King's case 
do reveal that natural justice does apply to a decision to exclude for 
inadequate academic performance although in the particular circumstances 
of that case the requirements 'happened to have been met (see Leary v 
National Union of Vehicle Builders [I9711 Ch. 34, 52). Similarly the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R e  Harelkin (supra) has indicated that 
questions of academic performance do not preclude elementary natural 
justice (including the right to personal audience and the opportunity to 
contradict prejudicial statements); though the court was clearly influenced 
in this case by a statutory provision requiring the relevant University 
committees "to hear and decide". 
Although in same circumstances it may be said that a student's examin- 
ation or assignment is his or her "hearing" on academic performance, the 
situation is different if the University decisionmakers on exclusion do not 
limit themselves to questions of academic performance. Thus in R v 
Senate of the University o f  Aston Ex p Roffey (supra) it was held that 
natural justice was applicable because the decisionmakers took into 
account extraneous personal matters on which it was only fair to hear the 
student's views. 
The final issue to be briefly discussed in this context is the legal basis 
on which a student can be said to be entitled to natural AS 
mentioned previously there is now slender authority to suggest that upon 
matriculation a student's relationship with the University becomes con- 
tractual. If this is correct, then contract as a traditional foundation for 
the requirements of natural justice would afford such a basis. 
However, a more substantial peg on which to hang natural justice 
would be that of simple status. The empowering Acts of Parliament in 
New Zealand make a student a "member" of the U n i ~ e r s i t y ~ ~  and it 
could be argued that this membership gives a type of position akin to an 
"office'. Thus at the very least a student could not be deprived of this 
position without a hearing. This becomes more obvious when it is recog- 
nised that in some areas Universities enjoy a virtual monopolistic control 
On the rejection of the need for an oral hearing see also Re  Polten (1976) 59 
DLR (2d) 197, 216 but compare Re  Harelkin and University of Regina (1979) 
96 DLR (3d) 14, at pp.21-22, 34 noted in text. 
' 2 F ~ r  debate on this question see H. W. R. Wade [I9691 LQR 468; J. F. Garner 
[I9741 90 LQR 6 and reply H. W. R. Wade [I9741 90 LQR 157. S. A. de Smith 
1974 C.L.J. 23 Consider also cases noted supra fn 11. 
'' See, for example, s.3 (2) University of Canterbury Act 1961 and supra fn 15. 
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over acquiring qualifications and that in disciplinary or exclusionary pro- 
ceedings a student's future livelihood and reputation are at stake.44 
Indeed although the empowering Acts of Parliament do not provide 
procedural steps for University Disciplinary Committees (which could as 
suggested in Re  Schabas and Caput of University o f  Toronto (supra) 
indicate they enjoy broad procedural freedom) the Universities in their 
internal legislation have generally been meticulous in providing procedural 
protection for students in their Disciplinary  committee^.^^ Thus the fair- 
ness of the universities may mitigate any harshness in the caselaw. 
Stof ,  Dismissal, Tenure and Natural Justice 
To date the law of employment of academic staff in New Zealand has 
been in a quiescent state and there is virtually no caselaw. However the 
prospects of academic redundancy are no longer inconceivable in New 
Zealand46 and the issue of procedural protection for staff may become an 
acute one. Again assuming that the Visitor is not a jurisdictional obstacle 
the Courts will have to determine the extent to which public law principles 
should be applicable to the University. 
The law is clear when an employer terminates a contract of employ- 
ment in a pure "master-servant" relationship. In brief an employer may 
dismiss his employees for whatever reason he thinks fit subject only to the 
requirement that he give the requisite period of notice or wages in lieu 
thereof. No hearing need be given and because of the personal nature of a 
contract of employment specific performance is generally not available as 
a remedy. However when the employer is a public body deriving its powers 
from statute it must exercise its powers in accordance with public law 
princp1es-e.g. it must act bona fide with the purpose of carrying out the 
objects of the statute. Moreover if the employee may be described as an 
officeholder in possession of a status which is removable only for cause 
then the public body must comply with the principles of natural justice 
before removing that status-even if the statute or regulations are silent 
on the question. This means, in effect, that if the rules of natural justice 
are not observed then the employee will be reinstated to his former position 
at least until the rules are properly observed.47 
The difficulty has always been to determine who qualifies as an office- 
holder. The perplexity of the question is seen in an important Privy 
"This was judicially noted in Herring v Templeman [I9731 3 All ER 569, 582. (In 
another context New Zealand Court of Appeal has indicated that the rules of 
natural justice apply when a body possesses a monopoly over a certain type of 
work-Stinitzato v Aucklnnd Boxing Association 119781 1 NZLR 1). 
*See, for example, the Disciplinary Regulations, at the University of Canterbury 
which provide inter alia, for legal or other representation. The Rules of Procedure 
of the Disciplinary Committee further provide, inter alia, for crossexamination 
and state that the Committee may adopt such new procedure under the Rules as 
it thinks fit provided that the procedure complies with the requirements of natural 
justice. Some regulations are however less favourable to the student-see for 
example Lincoln College's Disciplinary Regulations which expressly exclude legal 
representation. 
" See (1982) AUTNZ Bulletin p.1. 
"For a fuller discussion of the principles and cases see M. R. Freedland "The Con- 
tract of Employment" (O.U.P. 1976) at p.278-292. 
322 Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 1, 19821 
Council opinion concerning the dismissal of a University Professor. In 
Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v S i l ~ a ~ ~  the Privy Council determined 
that a Professor and Head of Department who was dismissed under a 
statutory provision requiring cause was merely in a master-servant relation- 
ship with the University so that natural justice did not apply. It  is perhaps 
not surprising that Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation 
[I9711 2 All E R  1278, 1295 stated he would not follow Silva's case and 
declared at 1244 that a pure master-servant relationship could only exist 
where "there is no element of public employment or service, no support 
by statute, nothing in the nature of an ofice or status which is capable of 
protection". (A later case, Stevenson v United Road Trunsport Union 
[I9761 3 All E R  29 ruled that natural justice may apply in any situation 
public or not, statutory or not, if cause needs to be shown before dis- 
missal.) 
The New Zealand statutory provisions do not expressly require cause as 
a precondition for dismissal.4Wevertheless, any dismissal derives from the 
exercise of a statutory power by a public body and this in itself differenti- 
ates academic employment from private employment. In Riddle v Univer- 
sity o f  Victoria (supra) it has been said that the entering into the contract 
and the performance and termination of the contract are all aspects of the 
University performing its public duty to provide instruction; and in Burns 
v Australian National University50 it was said that questions of appoint- 
ment and dismissal are fundamental to the University functioning as a 
statutory body. The former case also noted that the employment of academic 
staff was quite different from the more "mundane" function of employing 
maintenance staff; and the latter case similarly noted that Professors in a 
University are likely to hold other important positions on University 
bodies and committees so as to distinguish them from mere employees. 
When combined with the arguments of possession of a status akin to 
tenure, the importance of academic freedom and the consequences of 
dismissal (all discussed below) such comments are strong support for 
the need of natural justice. And the latest Canadian case R e  Paine and the 
University o f  Toronto (supra) suggests that the element of public employ- 
ment and support by statute means natural justice must be observed before 
academic employment is terminated.jl 
[I9651 1 WLR 76. Noted by S. M. Thio (1x5) MLR 475. 
"The only express limitations on the power of dismissal are found in s.36(1) Uni- 
versity of Victoria Act 1961 and s.18 University of Waikato Act 1963 (as amended) 
which require a recommendation from the Senate or Academic Board respectively 
as a precondition to the Council exercising its power to remove staff. This would 
only be true of the other Universities if the decision to dismiss could be described 
as "an academic matter" e.g. s.36 University of Canterbury Act 1961. 
'O (Unreported) Federal Court of Australia, 27th April 1982 per Ellicott J. The 
decision was subsequently reversed on appeal by the General Division of the 
Federal Court of Australia on 8th October 1982. The basis for reversal was the 
finding by the appellate court that the professor in question had been dismissed 
under terms of a contract rather than "under an enactment" within the meaning 
of that expression in s.3 of the Administrative Division (Judicial) Review Act 
1977 (Australia). 
P ' C ~ n ~ i ~ t e n t  with this approach is the recent decision of the Ontario High Court of 
Justice in R e  Ruiperez and Board of Governors of Lakehead University (1982) 
130 DLR (3d) 422. 
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Many of the cases from the Canadian jurisdiction in this area have 
concerned the question of tenure.52 Tenure is important because it confers 
a property like "status" on the recipient who then approximates more an 
"officer" than a mere "servant". Further, if it could be argued that the 
notion of tenure necessarily qualifies the statutory discretion to dismiss 
then tenured academic staff could be dismissed only for cause and a 
hearing would be required prior to such dismissal. (Equally one could not 
be divested of tenure itself without a hearing.) 
In New Zealand however, there is no provision in either empowering 
or internal University legislation to provide a legal source for tenure and 
the Universities do not seem to make express contracts for unqualified 
tenure. Instead there is a widespread understanding that once a staff 
member has successfully graduated from any probationary appointment 
for a fixed term then the University has in fact granted meaningful "tenure" 
to the appointee. Thus the pervasive belief in tenure derives mostly from 
custom and past practice.53 If tenure therefore has a legal basis it would 
usually have to be as a term implied into a contract of employment. 
Perhaps tenure can be seen as so essential to University functioning 
that it must be an implied term. Certainly EHicott J in Hrrrns v ANU 
(supra) vigorously supported such an idea when he stated at p.23 that 
"[ilt is vital to the fulfilment of the University's functions as an independ- 
ent educational institution committed to the search for truth that the tenure 
of its professional staff be free from arbitrary attack. I can think of no 
principle more basic to the existence of a University in a free society". 
On appeal the Federal Court of Australia expressed complete agreement 
with that view. 
Contrary to such support for tenure are some early Canadian cases. For 
instance the notion that tenure for life could arise from either an under- 
standing or from an express statement in correspondence from the Uni- 
versity President was described as "startling" by Orde J in Craig v 
Governors o f  University o f  Toronto.54 The court there felt that if an 
understanding of service for a life-time was binding on the University then 
the principles of mutuality would mean it was equally binding on the 
lecturer who would be unable to leave without the University's consent. 
This was described as absurd and the court declared that any custom or 
usage, however general or long established in its operation, could not have 
"See the valuable discussion on this by D. M. Mullan in "Canadian Academic 
Tenure and Employment: An Uncertain Future" (1982) 7 Dalh. LJ 72 and in 
unpublished papers "The Modern Law of Tenure" (Conference Proceedings, Dal- 
housie University, 1975) and in "Tenure: Employment for Life or Uncertain 
Future" (Conference Proceedings, University of Victoria, 1980). Tenure is taken 
by Mullan to mean the right to employn~ent at University until retiring age unless 
the University establishes cause-cause meaning essentially moral turpitude, mis- 
conduct and incapacity; quaere financial necessity. 
"A practice noted for example in the University of Canterbury Information Hand- 
book for Staff which provides that appointment subject to three months notice 
has "never in the past resulted in any insecurity of tenure". (On the question of 
whether a provision in a University handbook can be incorporated into the contract 
of employment see Wheeldon v Simon Fraser University (1971) 15 DLR (3d) 
641). 
" (1923) 53 OR 312. The case has subsequently been followed. See for example 
Smith v Wesley College [I9231 2 WWR 195. 
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the force of law so as to override the University's statutory power of 
dismissal. 
This finding is of special significance. For in New Zealand it is argu- 
able that tenure (either as an implied or express contractual term) is 
rendered somewhat worthless by the statutory power conferred on the 
University to appoint ". . .upon such notice, as it thinks fit".55 NO private 
contract can fetter the exercise of a statutory discretion. Thus in De Groot 
v University o f  V i ~ t o r i a ~ ~  Barker J held that a contract with a non- 
academic member of staff which provided for "permanent appointment" 
was ultra vires the then existing statutory provision which provided for an 
unqualified power of dismissal. 
However although custom and understandings (and perhaps even 
express contractual terms) might not be able to create tenure with its 
necessary incident of security from dismissal such customs or terms must 
surely create a status similar to tenure so that natural justice is required. 
This argument is strengthened if it is conceded that academic freedom 
is an implied purpose of the empowering University legislation and that 
the promotion of academic freedom must therefore qualify any statutory 
discretion including that of dismissal.57 
Certainly academic freedom has been described by the Australian 
Federal Court as "the very principle upon which the University is founded" 
(Burns v ANU, supra, at p.23), and by the United States Supreme Court 
as a principle "of transcendent value to all of us and not merely the 
teachers concerned" (Keyishan v Board of Regents (385) US 589, 603, 
17 L.Ed. 2d 629, 640). It  would seem then that the protection of academic 
freedom may be an implied statutory object and that any dismissal without 
the pursuance of natural justice would therefore be contrary to this object. 
A final argument in favo~lr of natural justice is the serious effect of 
dismissal on a University lecturer's future livelihood. As was pointed out 
in Smith v Wesley College [I9231 3 WWR 193, 202 University lecturers 
have a highly specialised expertise and training which means they have 
few opportunities for suitable alternative employment. Given that academic 
staff are not covered by any award under the Industrial Relations Act 
1973 it would seem obvious that, at the very least, the procedural pro- 
tection of natural justice is required. 
The New Role o f  the Visitor 
The judicial activity displayed in the area of natural justice raises again 
the central question of the role and power of the Visitor within the 
University. As noted previously it has been judicially accepted in New 
Zealand in Bell v University of Aucklmd (supra) that the Visitor is more 
than a "ceremonial functionary", and it must therefore be accepted that 
" See, for example, s.18 (b) University of Canterbury Act 1961 (as amended). See 
also discussion of F. M. Brookfield "Tenure in the Universities" [I9811 R.L. 64. 
66 (Unreported) Supreme Court, Wellington 12.12.77 A385/75. 
''Academic freedom has been defined as "that aspect of intellectual liberty wn- 
cerned with the peculiar institutional needs of the academic community" in 
"Academic Freedom" (1967) 81 Harv L. Rev. 1045, 1048 (author unknown). 
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he does possess some real power-although he has yet to exercise it.58 
The problem of course lies in defining the boundaries of that power 
because even the staunchest advocates ofvisitatorial jurisdiction wodd not 
claim that his once impressive jurisdiction has remained unabated. Thus, 
in Pate1 v Bradford University Megarry V-C described the once funda- 
mental power of inspection at the visitor's initiative as "obs~lescent".~~ 
Likewise the once important visitatorial power of expulsion of University 
members must also be regarded as obsolescent in view of the empowering 
University legislation appointing the Councils to have "entire manage- 
ment" of the University. As stated in Re Wilson it is inconceivable that 
the Visitor is intended to be "ruler over those who are appointed to 
govern".60 Similarly the once important visitatorial function of supervision 
of the administration of the property of the foundation must be regarded 
as severely qualified in light of the statutory powers accorded to the 
Minister of Education in this area.61 
It is apparent that a new theory of visitatorial jurisdiction needs to be 
devised whereby the spirit of the old caselaw is adapted to the reality of 
modern circumstances. This is not difficult if it is remembered that the 
essential feature of visitatorial jurisdiction was its private domestic nature. 
Thus when it was held that the Visitor was competent to interpret the 
statutes of a College it was contemplated he would be interpreting private 
legislation of a founder and not "the law of the land7' discovered in Acts 
of Parliament. 
In the present day the University with its statutory origin will be 
involved in many disputes of a public or contractual nature which, for 
reasons discussed above, are more appropriately dealt with by the courts. 
However within the University there exist many internal customs, con- 
ventions, rulings, regulations which are not so obviously justiciable and 
it is in dealing with these matters that the Visitor could still retain a 
valuable residual function as a quasi-ombudsman. Thus if after exhausting 
all formal internal procedures a member of the University felt a legiti- 
mate grievance about a purely internal decision he could apply to the 
Visitor for review. The Visitor would not act as a court of appeal from 
'% Royal Commission into the University of 1880 had reported that the office of 
visitor of the University and the University Colleges "should not be of a merely 
honorary nature, but should be brought into connection, in some degrees with the 
gsneral system of education in the colonv" (see J. C. Beaglehole "The University 
of New Zealand: an historical study. Wellington, 1957 at p.137). Also if an office 
is purely ceremonial it would probably be so specified i.1 the empowering legislation. 
(See the provision for the office of Chancellor of the University of Canterbury in 
s.25(3) University of Canterbury Act 1951. 
"[1978] WLR 1488 at 1493. The power is described in Philips v Bury 4 Mod 106, 
122. However this "obsolescent" power does in fact seem to have been recently 
invoked in South Australia. See Sadler op. cit. at p.20. 
so 0885) 18 NSR 180, 197. The wide powers of a governing body are seen for 
example, in s.17 and s.34(3) of the University of Canterbury Act 1961. The 
importance of such powers in the context of visitatorial jurisdiction was also 
acknowledged in Ex p. McFayden (1945) 45 SR (NSW) 200 at 205. Note though 
that statute accords the Governor-General some influence over appointments to 
the governing body. See, for example, s.6(2) (c) University of canterbury Act 
1961. 
" See, for example, s.51 University of Canterbury Act 1961. 
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that decision (see University of Melbourne v Sirnone [I9811 VR 378, 387); 
nevertheless the Visitor could in appropriate cases review the matter in 
the light of University practice and the principles of good administration. 
Where necessary he could give advice or make recommendations to the 
University's governing body which, it could be expected, would accept 
them. (The Governor-General would not of course necessarily exercise 
these functions in person but as is proposed with the Visitatorial deter- 
mination at the University of Waikato he could delegate them to appropri- 
ate persons.) 62 
One could speculate about the matters which might fall within the 
Visitor's competence. If for instance correspondence from a Head of 
Department led a staff member prior to appointment to believe he was to 
take over the Headship or if a student was admitted in error to an 
Honours course by a member of the Department, it is then possible that 
the Visitor could recommend that the Department should not act incon- 
sistently with their previous representations or actions, despite the fact 
that no question of estoppel could be successfully raised in a court of law. 
Indeed there are innumerable hypothetical disputes concerning the 
"management of the domus" which would be appropriate solely for visita- 
torial decision-for example, if a student wished to challenge whether he 
fell within the purview of an Academic (or Professional) Board ruling, or 
i f  a staff member wished to challenge a refusal to promote him alleging 
that philosophical differences with the Head of Department led to a negative 
recommendation, or if a Department wished to challenge a decision to 
disestablish a lecturing position. 
On such internal matters the Visitor would enjoy a jurisdiction upon 
which the courts would not wish to trespass. Consistency with the tenor 
of the old common law would thus be attained. 
The most recent judicial authority in Australia supports this view. In 
M~lrdoch University v Bloonz [I9801 WAR 193, the defendant had been 
employed under a contract of service whereby he was entitled to twelve 
months sabbatical leave of study and travel as approved by the Vice- 
Chancellor (unless the Senate had otherwise directed). When however 
the defendant submitted his study leave programme for approval the 
Vice-Chancellor, without any Senate direction, informed him that 
approval had been granted for six months only. The defendant applied to 
the Visitor for a declaration of entitlement to twelve months leave-firstly 
on the basis of his contract of service and alternatively on the basis that 
the decision of the Vice-Chancellor was harsh and unjust and contrary to 
Senate resolutions. The plaintiff University argued that neither of the 
defendant's claims was within the jurisdiction of the Visitor. The Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia was required to consider 
this argument. The Court proceeded to distinguish rights enjoyed under the 
law of the land (such as rights under contract) and matters of an intra- 
mural nature. Thus the Court held that the defendant's first claim for a 
Ricquier---op. cit. p.628 and Sadler-op. cit. p.21 note the acceptability of dele- 
gation. The delegates for the determination at the University of Waikato are a 
retired Judge and a senior academic-"The Christchurch Press" 7 September 1982. 
It would seem to be always desirable that at least one of the delegates was a person 
fully aware of the spirit and workings of the universities. 
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declaration was essentially a claim for a declaration of right concerning 
the common law question of contractual construction. Burt CJ said, at 
198 "[ilt is not a matter which relates to the management of the house and 
it is not a matter in difference which can be resolved by the application of 
the law of the house". The majority therefore held the first claim for a 
declaration was outside the Visitor's jurisdiction. However the second 
claim was unanimously held to be within the Visitor's jurisdiction and 
therefore outside that of the courts; for the second claim concerned the 
manner in which the Vice-Chancellor had exercised his jurisdiction. This 
was truly a domestic or internal matter. 
It is suggested that Bloom's case provides a neat illustration of the 
modern visitatorial jurisdiction. However, the picture has been a little 
blurred by the recent judgment of Sir Henry Winneke in the exercise of 
his visitatorial jurisdiction in Utziversity of Melbourne v Simone (supra). 
In that decision Sir Henry Winneke indicated that if an Act of Parliament 
was the foundation instrument of a University it could impose a duty which 
fell within the exclusive purview of the Visitor provided that the duty was 
merely of a domestic nature. However it is doubtful what value, if any, a 
Visitor's decision enjoys as a precedent in future judicial determinations; 
and it is submitted that when an Act of Parliament is in issue then any 
duty under it would fall within the province of the courts-although 
domestic characteristics may be influential in the courts declining a discre- 
tionary remedy.6" 
Thus it is contended that the University should be regarded as simply 
another statutory body (albeit one with special characteristics) and that 
any issue of public law or contract should therefore be justiciable. How- 
ever if an issue of purely domestic administration arises it is then that the 
Visitor would become the appropriate forum for complaint. In this way 
the Visitor could be seen as providing additional rather than lesser protec- 
tion for University members and a Visitor awakened from slumber would 
indeed be a welcome guest. 
=Though see R v Dunsheath ex p. Meredith, supra fn 20. 

